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Abstract : This paper examines probabilistic versions of the fine-tuning argument for design
(FTA), with an emphasis on the interpretation of the probability statements involved in such
arguments. Three categories of probability are considered: physical, epistemic, and logical. Of the
three possibilities, I argue that only logical probability could possibly support a cogent probabilistic
FTA. However, within that framework, the premises of the argument require a level of justification
that has not been met, and, it is reasonable to believe, will not be met anytime soon.
1 Introduction
A fine-tuning argument for design (FTA) begins with the observation that certain physical param-
eters or initial conditions have values that could not differ very much without rendering human
life impossible. FTAs infer from this observation that the universe is a product of a designing
intelligence whose purpose it was in creating the universe to bring about or allow for human life.
Contemporary FTAs often take the form of probabilistic arguments. It is the aim of this paper to
explore the difficulties that probabilistic FTAs run into when formulated within any of the main
interpretive approaches to probability. I conclude that the only framework that could support a
cogent probabilistic FTA is logical probability, but that significant obstacles stand in the way of
realizing such a possibility.
I begin in sections two and three with a characterization of fine-tuning, and a sketch of the
Bayesian version of the probabilistic FTA. The bulk of the argument is presented in section four,
where I consider the three main interpretive approaches to probability, viz., physical, epistemic,
and logical probabilities. I explain why FTAs cannot be formulated in any cogent way in terms
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of physical probabilities – a point that does not seem to be seriously in dispute. I then turn
to epistemic probabilities and show that such formulations run into a debilitating version of the
problem of old evidence. This leaves logical probability. I argue that logical probability is the
only prospect for formulating a cogent probabilistic FTA, but that the burden of justification for
the premises in a logical probability formulation of FTA is so great that it the prospects for this
approach are not bright. At any rate the premises have not yet been justified. In section five I
respond to anticipated objections.
2 Fine-tuning
Suppose X denotes some feature of the universe, and that a quantity Q, either a parameter in
a correct theory or a measurement of some “initial condition,” takes the value R. Furthermore,
suppose that for some possible changes δR in the value of Q, where δR/R is very small, the fact
that X is a feature of the universe is incompatible with either Q ≥ R + δR or Q ≤ R − δR (or
both). We shall then say that the universe is fine-tuned for X.1
FTAs variously appeal to the claims that the existence of human life, or of intelligent crea-
tures, or of biological organisms, or of matter organized in any very complex manner, depends on
a large number of facts about the universe. Most of these facts are further dependent on a few fun-
damental facts of physics, viz., the masses and lifetimes of the elementary particles, the strengths,
both absolute and relative, of the four fundamental forces. Many of these lattter dependences meet
the fine-tuning criteria.
3 Probabilistic Formulations of FTAs
Consider a schematic formulation of a probabilistic FTA using Bayes’s theorem. In what follows,
it will be assumed that Pr(·|·) is a probability function. Let CR represent the hypothesis that
the universe was created by a God whose purpose it was to allow or bring about human life.
{CR, J1, J2, . . . , Jn} are an exhaustive set of mututally exclusive hypotheses about the origin of the
universe. b represents “background knowledge,” and should be taken to include LR: The universe
having feature X is a prerequisite for human life (intelligent creatures, etc.).
1This account is a modified version of that given by Sherry Roush in an especially lucid essay [13].
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FT : Physical parameter Q is fine-tuned for X, in virtue of its having the value R.
HP : Pr(FT |CR∧b) = r, such that r > k, where k is some threshold value for a “high” probability.
LP : Pr(FT |b) = [Pr(FT |CR ∧ b) · Pr(CR|b)] +∑ni=1[Pr(FT |Ji ∧ b) · Pr(Ji|b)] = s, such that
s r.
By Bayes’s theorem, Pr(CR|FT ∧ b) = Pr(CR|b) · [Pr(FT |CR∧ b)/Pr(FT |b)] = Pr(CR|b) · (r/s).
Since r  s,
Pr(CR|FT ∧ b) Pr(CR|b). (1)
In other words, FT greatly increases the probability of the hypothesis that the universe was
created by a God whose purpose it was to allow or bring about human life.
3.1 Likelihood Version
A variant of this probabilistic version of the argument is an argument that appeals to likelihoods
rather than probabilities of hypotheses. Elliott Sober has argued that design arguments in general
are best understood as likelihood arguments [15], and the “Fine-tuning Design Argument” offered
by Robin Collins [3] is an example of a formulation in these terms.
Here the term ‘likelihood’ is used in the following technical sense: the likelihood of a hy-
pothesis H on observation O is defined as, L(H|O) ≡ Pr(O|H). Advocates of likelihood methods
in scientific reasoning endorse a principle according to which, when an observation O has a well-
defined probability under each of a number of competing hypotheses H1,H2, · · ·, O should be taken
to support the hypothesis with greatest likelihood on O, i.e., O supports the hypothesis Hi such
that L(Hi|O) > L(Hj |O) for any j 6= i [14].
The likelihood version of the fine-tuning argument, then, is similar to the Bayesian version in
that it relies on variants of the premises HP and LP , although the conclusion is stated differently:
HP ′: L(CR|FT ∧ b) = r, such that r > k, where k is some threshold value for a “high” probability.
LP ′: For every i = 1, 2, . . . , n : L(Ji|FT ∧ b) r.
Therefore, FT suppports CR over any competing hypothesis.
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4 Interpretations of Probabilities in FTAs
In this section I canvass the main interpretive approaches to probability and discuss the prospects
for formulating a probabilistic FTA within these approaches. I will not concern myself with the
relative merits of each approach, but will assume for the sake of argument that each is an otherwise
viable approach to interpreting probability statements.
4.1 Physical probability
Statements of physical probability directly describe the objects, events, and such to which they
pertain. They do not describe or prescribe the beliefs of the inquirer, nor do they describe properties
of or relations between propositions about the subjects of inquiry. The most prominent accounts
of physical probability treat them either as long-run relative frequencies of outcomes of a specified
event (such as the tossing of a coin) or as propensities, i.e., dispositional properties of an individual
experimental setup that describe that setup’s tendency toward a certain outcome.
Only the likelihood version of an FTA can be based on physical probabilities, since physical
probabilities cannot generally be attributed to hypotheses, as required in the Bayesian argument.
This will not affect the discussion here, as the relevant points can be made entirely by discussing
the premise LP , which has an analogue in the likelihood version.
Crucially, physical probability statements are positive descriptions of (possibly hypothetical)
states of affairs, not expressions of ignorance. They either attribute some relative frequency of
outcomes to a sequence of events, or they attribute some physical property to a state of affairs.
Now clearly LP cannot be interpreted as a statement about relative frequency. No advocate of any
version of the fine-tuning argument has claimed to be able enumerate the competing hypotheses
{Ji}, which would be a minimum requirement for making justified statements about the physical
probability of any outcomes under those hypotheses. Presumably each hypothesis Ji would describe
a universe-generating mechanism that would determine values for the physical parameters of any
universe it generated. We have no present knowledge of the possible mechanisms that might qualify,
and no knowledge of the physical probabilities appropriate to these hypothetical mechanisms (see
also [9]).
Typically the hypotheses with which CR is compared in fine-tuning arguments are referred
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to as “the chance hypothesis” or “non-theistic creation.” These expressions fail utterly to identify
any probability distribution in frequency or propensity terms with regard to different values, but
could apply indifferently to mechanisms with wildly different probability profiles. We thus have
no grounds for making justified claims about the physical probability of such outcomes under the
alternative hypotheses {Ji}.
For most theists, the statement HP would also seem to be problematic if regarded as a
statement in terms of physical probabilities. Even setting aside the apparent attribution of physical
properties to God as a by-product of terminology, HP would have to be regarded as stating either
that were God to create an endless sequence of universes God would sometimes create them one
way and sometimes another, or that God inherently has both a disposition to create a world
suitable for human life and a (weaker) disposition not to do so. I do not know whether these
constitute absurdities, but I suspect they will fit at best awkwardly into most theist views.These
problems could of course be avoided by insisting that CR does not merely make FT probably
but in fact entails that FT is true. (Note that, at least on the relative frequency view, setting
Pr(FT |CR ∧ b) = 1 is not sufficient by itself to avoid the problem, as this is compatible with
God creating any number of universes in which FT is false.) However, advocates of probabilistic
fine-tuning arguments have not in general taken this approach, which in any case would not solve
the problems encountered by LP .
4.2 Epistemic probability
Epistemic probabilities do not characterize directly the subjects about which we inquire, but char-
acterize instead our beliefs about those subjects, by quantifying either the degree to which a person
does or should believe some proposition or the degree to which it is rational for a person to believe
some proposition. Furthermore, on this view, Bayes’s theorem tells us how we ought to modify such
beliefs in response to new information. (The present argument applies equally to both “personalist”
and “objective” epistemic probabilities, so their disagreements will not concern us.)2
2Monton [12] has argued that the fine-tuning argument is strongest when formulated in terms of subjective
probability. My approach shares with Monton’s an emphasis on clarifying the interpretation of probability employed
in probabilistic FTAs, as well the employment of the old evidence problem as an analytic device. Nonetheless, we
reach quite different conclusions, as will be seen.
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As before, we can begin by considering LP . In terms of epistemic probabilities, such a
statement can be taken to mean that, supposing a person to have b as background knowledge, that
person should have very little belief in FT (or that there is very little reason to believe FT . The
FTA, thus understood, runs into a problem arising from one version of the so-called “anthropic
principle” (see, e.g., [1] [2][6] [13] [15]).
Elliott Sober’s version of this objection holds that the probabilities assessed in either the
Bayesian or likelihood versions of the FTA must be conditionalized on the proposition AP (for
“anthropic principle”): We exist and if we exist, then FT must be true. This, of course, has the
consequence that Pr(FT |CR∧AP ∧b) = Pr(FT |Ji∧AP ∧b) = 1, for any i = 1, 2, · · · , n, rendering
fine-tuning evidentially irrelevant [15]. The application of the anthropic principle is controversial,
however, as various objections have been raised against Sober’s treatment of such “observation
selection effects” (e.g., [19] [12]).
I will argue that a similar objection can be made against probabilistic FTAs employing
epistemic probabilities in a way that does not invite the kinds of criticisms that have been invoked
by Sober’s use of the anthropic principle. As Bradley Monton has pointed out [12], the problem is
essentially similar to what Clark Glymour introduced as the “old evidence” problem for Bayesian
inference [7]: If E represents a fact already known to be true by person S, then S will already
have a full belief in E, i.e., PrS(E|b) = 1 for whatever background knowledge S possesses. This
has the consequence that conditionalizing on E cannot raise the probability of any hypothesis
for S, i.e., for every H, PrS(H|E ∧ b) = Pr(H|b). This result seems to be at odds both with
the history of science and with common sense. One common response has been to insist that in
such situations, we evaluate hypotheses using “counterfactual” epistemic probabilities: Supposing
that we did not already know E to be true, the appropriate epistemic probability for E based on
our other background knowledge would be the value that we should employ in applying Bayes’s
theorem.
I claim that advocates of FTAs using epistemic probability can neither accept nor reject this
solution without invalidating either LP or HP . Seeing the problem requires examining the role
played by the background knowledge LR.
Accepting the counterfactual solution to the old evidence problem requires that one must
remove FT from the background knowledge b. This is essentially the approach taken by Monton
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[12], who argues that within a subjective probability framework, an FTA can be probative, provided
that Bayesian conditionalization takes place with respect, not to the agents actual probability
function, but rather an “ur-probability” function that is generated by stipulating that the agent
lacks full belief in the proposition that the universe is life-sustaining. Of course, “lacking full belief”
in a proposition is insufficient by itself to determine this ur-probability, and, as Monton notes (ibid.,
420), there is no accepted approach for doing so. Nonetheless, I will not pursue that problem here.
The more fundamental problem is that any attempt to implement the strategy for an FTA in terms
of epistemic probability will leave the argument without any persuasive force.
Removing FT from b will be insufficient to solve the problem if there remains in b any set
of propositions that entail FT . I wish to claim that LR together with background knowledge (of
the relevant physics or biology, for example) entails FT .
The entailment holds because the possession of any background knowledge at all entails the
existence of the knower. Lest the point be misunderstood, I do not claim that the conjunction of LR
with the content of any statement derived from physics or biology entails FT , but rather that LR, in
combination with the knowledge of physics or biology (or anything else) entails FT . In the absence
of any knower, such statements might be true, but could not be treated as (background) knowledge.
But treating them as knowledge is essential to the deployment of epistemic probabilities, insofar as
these probabilities are intended to characterize actual or (in this case) hypothetical beliefs of the
epistemic agent under the supposition that the agent possesses specified background knowledge.
Thus the entailment proceeds: FT is a necessary condition for the existence of knowing creatures.
I possess background knowledge b. I am therefore a knowing creature. So FT is true.
As a consequence, the old evidence problem persists unless we also delete LR from b when
we evaluate the evidential weight of FT based on the calculation of Pr(FT |b) and Pr(FT |CR∧ b).
But in that case it is no longer apparent why Pr(FT |CR∧ b) should be higher than Pr(FT |Ji ∧ b)
for any i = 1, 2, · · · , n. If we do not know that feature X is a prerequisite for human life, then we
have no grounds for thinking that the hypothesis that the universe was created by a God whose
purpose it was to bring about human life makes it more likely that the universe is fine-tuned for
X.
Suppose we reject the counterfactual solution, so that LR is included in b. In that case
Pr(FT |b) = Pr(FT |CR ∧ b) = 1, and FT is evidentially worthless. If we do know that feature
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X is a prerequisite for human life, then a background theory that tells us X can obtain only in
a fine-tuned way allows us to infer that the universe must be fine-tuned for X, regardless of any
explanatory hypothesis.
If the feature X in question is human life itself, then the piece of background knowledge at
issue would not be LR, but whatever theoretical knowledge entails that human life is incompatible
with values of the allegedly fine-tuned parameter that differ greatly from its actual value. The
problem remains.
4.3 Logical probability
As a means of avoiding these difficulties, it might seem promising to consider probabilities as
abstracted from the actual or prescribed beliefs of epistemic agents, characterizing directly relations
between propositions.3
In Richard Swinburne’s account, every proposition has an intrinsic probability equal to its
probability conditional on a bare tautology. Intrinsic probabilities are greater for propositions with
greater simplicity, and lesser for porpositions with large scope (and are of course equal to 1 and
0 for logical truths and contradictions, respectively). A conditional probability such as Pr(H|E)
measures “how much reason [E] provides for believing” H to be true ([16], 62). This statement
should not be taken as implicitly relativized to any epistemic agent. The probability statements
describes a relation between proposition that exists independently of the beliefs or capacities of any
epistemic agent.
Consequently, Swinburne is not concerned in his FTA with anyone’s background knowledge.
Instead, he argues that, as an objective matter, the fact of fine-tuning provides inductive support for
fine-tuning in the sense that, in the absence of any background information other than a tautology
k and the existence of an orderly universe O, Pr(CR|FT ∧ O ∧ k)  Pr(CR|O ∧ k), where this
is one stage in a cumulative argument for the probable truth of theism on the basis of numerous
relevant considerations [17] [18].4 Of course, estimating Pr(CR|FT ∧O∧ k) requires consideration
3This semantic characterization of logical probability, as a describing relations between propositions, rather than
‘physical’ or doxastic states, allows for logical probability to be characterized independently of any particular method-
ology for determining probability functions, such as the Principle of Indifference.
4The presence of O here simply reflects the fact that the first stage in this cumulative argument is to show that
the orderliness of the universe is evidence for theism, i.e., that Pr(CR|O ∧ k)  Pr(CR|k). Nothing here turns on
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of Pr(FT |O ∧ k), but unlike the epistemic interpretation, the probability interpretation regards
this latter quantity as characterizing directly a relation between FT and O ∧ k. The question of
background knowledge does not arise here, because one is only seeking to establish the existence
of the relation in question.
So it would seem that if a successful probabilistic FTA is to be mounted, then logical prob-
abilities must be used. Such an approach has been criticized. In two independently developed
arguments [11] [4], the point has been made that the argument depends on highly problematic
probability distributions. If the fine-tuned parameters are considered to have ranges of logically
possible values that have at least no upper bound, and the principle of indifference is applied, then
the resulting distribution is non-normalizable. Yet the choice of any other distribution, though it
might be normalizable, would seem to be arbitrary. This would seem to be a damning criticism,
though it seems to invite the response that the critics are “making too much of a technical issue
in probability theory” ([12], 410). Furthermore, the technical issue may lend itself to resolution
through innovative approaches to probability such as the use of infinitesimals, as Swinburne has
suggested ([18], 178n).
So let us suppose that this problem can be somehow resolved. Although I do not argue,
under this supposition, that an FTA in terms of logical probability cannot succeed, I do argue that
no advocate of such an argument has thus far provided the justification of LP needed for such an
argument to succeed, and that the prospects are not promising.
Whatever justification LP might seem to have depends rather strongly on a kind of intuitive
appeal that really only works for epistemic – in fact, subjective – probability. That appeal works
something like this: Suppose that the universe is not the work of a Creator whose purpose it is to
bring about the conditions in which life is possible. Would you then expect fine-tuning to obtain?
Many people find it natural to say that under those circumstances they would not expect fine-
tuning, so that a low probability seems correct. This could work (if the problems in the previous
section could be somehow solved), since it is, after all, simply a question of what one thinks (this
is the key to Monton’s argument that subjective probabilities make the strongest FTAs).
Versions of the argument resting on logical probability cannot be so sanguine about this
intuition. If we are using logical probabilties, expectations have no direct bearing on the assignment
this feature of the argument.
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of probabilities whatsoever. Logical probabilities are an objective measure of support relationships,
and thus have to be defended in some other way. This means that LP has to be defended as a
statement describing objective support relationships between FT and all competing hypotheses
whether or not we have thought of them.
More precisely, the condition for FT to increase the probability of CR is:5
Pr(FT |CR)[1− Pr(CR)] >
n∑
i=1
[Pr(FT |Ji) · Pr(Ji)] (2)
This is merely the condition for FT to be at all positively relevant for CR, not for making CR
highly probable, or even more probably true than false. Nonetheless, it is far from clear what
grounds we have for believing the condition to be satisfied. Of particular importance is how little
we know about the Jis. Is there a highly plausible alternative to CR that renders FT probable? Are
there numerous somewhat plausible alternatives that do the same? Remember that “alternatives”
here does not refer to theories we can think of, but to all possible alternatives to CR, including
those beyond our ability to grasp, let alone invent. To be justified in asserting LP , understood as a
statement about logical probabilities, we must take ourselves to be justified in answering no to these
questions. Perhaps we would be so justified if it were true that, were such plausible alternative
theories to exist, we would have thought of them – but I cannot think of any good reason to assume
that this is true. I suspect that it is in fact false.
Swinburne, with characteristic thoroughness, is one advocate of a probabilistic FTA who has
attempted to defend the premise LP in terms of logical probabilities. The crux of his argument is
that the “intrinsic” probability of any proposition is determined by the factors of scope and sim-
plicity. Greater scope means lower probability, while greater simplicity means higher probability.6
Swinburne claims to be able to state, of any theory that is a competitor to CR for explaining
FT , that it will either be too simple to yield FT as an outcome (life requiring a certain degree of
complexity in terms of kinds of particles and forces between them), or too complicated to have any
considerable intrinsic probability.
5This can be shown very easily by noting the result from Bayes’s theorem that, provided Pr(FT ) 6= 0,
Pr(CR|FT ) > Pr(CR) iff Pr(FT |CR) > Pr(FT ), and then applying the total probability theorem to the right
hand side of the latter inequality in the form Pr(FT ) = Pr(FT |CR) · Pr(CR) +Pni=1[Pr(FT |Ji) · Pr(Ji)]. Some
simple algebraic manipulation then yields eq. (2)
6I will not here enter into a critique of Swinburne’s methodology for determining intrinsic probabilities. This
should not be taken as indicating assent to its reasonableness for evidential evaluations.
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Swinburne’s operative assumption here seems to be that for any theory other than CR, you
only get a complex world if you have a complex theory. But Swinburne does not give us any
reason for this assumption, or even seem to notice that he is assuming a fundamental ontology
(apparently that of the current Standard Model) that is not the only one possible (and it is all
possible theories, on this approach, that must be taken into account7). So even granting his criteria
for determining intrinsic probabilities, the FTA using logical probability rests on an unjustified,
even dubious, premise.
5 Objections and replies
I will consider two objections. The first concerns my analysis of the old evidence problem in the
context of epistemic probability. The second objection is more general.
5.1 The possibility of disembodied intelligence
In my analysis of the FTA using epistemic probability I claimed that the old evidence problem
resisted solution because the possession of any knowledge whatsoever would entail the truth FT . I
claimed that having knowledge requires a knower, and hence the conditions must obtain that make
the existence of knowers a possibility. I further claimed that these conditions include FT . However,
it might be countered that FT is a requirement only of the existence of embodied knowers.
That possibility suggests the following strategy for implementing the counterfactual strategy
for dealing with old evidence: I remove from my background knowledge any beliefs that entail
that I exist as an embodied knower. (In the context of discussing the FTA we are committed
already to taking the possible existence of disembodied intelligences seriously, since the creator
would presumably be such [19].) This allows me to deploy my knowledge of the relevant science that
establishes LR without getting the unwanted result that Pr(FT |LR∧b) = Pr(FT |CR∧LR∧b) = 1.
This looks promising, but there is one dubious aspect to it: It is not at all clear that one can
coherently suppose simultaneously that one is perhaps disembodied while also claiming to hold onto
one’s knowledge of a significant chunk of theoretical knowledge regarding physics, chemistry, and
biology. Or, to put it differently, the kind of evidence that establishes such knowledge as knowledge
7In the context of Swinburne’s cumulative argument, it is all possible theories compatible with the “orderliness”
of the universe that must be considered.
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seems to depend to a large degree on the embodiment not just of myself, but of many others who
have deployed material means to gather data on a large body of physical phenomena.
The point here is not that such an approach cannot work, but rather that it is very unclear
just what the approach is going to demand of us. I might take myself to know the relevant science
but without committing myself to any particular belief about how I know it. But then in what
sense does this constitute knowledge for me? If I were to remove from my background information
all beliefs about material procedures that connect my experiences to physical phenomena that serve
as evidence for the relevant sciences, it would seem also to involve the elimination of my beliefs
about those physical phenomena and hence the theories that explain them. This consideration is
perhaps not conclusive, but the FTA advocate owes us a more detailed story here about how such
an approach would work.
Perhaps a more damning problem concerns the effect of abstracting out my awareness of my
embodied status on the premise HP . Suppose that I consider myself as a possibly disembodied
knower. Now if I consider how very special the conditions must be for there to be embodied
knowers, and I ask myself whether I expect a creator to realize those conditions, it is hard to see
just what reasons I would have for thinking this to be very probable. To think such an outcome
very probable would seem to require some very substantive assumptions about the creator, such
as that the creator wishes to create beings that are subject to physical forces. Most of the reasons
I might entertain for making such assumptions would seem to derive from beliefs that already
involve seeing myself as embodied, such as a belief that the experience of physical pain serves some
ennobling purpose that lends greater dignity to human life. If I were not myself embodied, or at
least had been at some time, would I believe this? Would I even know what it meant? Setting aside
all beliefs that implicate my own physical existence seems to rob me of any basis for attributing to
a creator an intention to bring about such physical existence.
5.2 Appeal to intuitions: the firing squad example
One example has circulated so widely in defense of FTAs that it deserves a separate comment
[8] [5]. The example is supposed to be analogous to an FTA and to be intuitively obvious in its
conclusions. If one is persuaded by this example, one might be inclined to think the difficulty lies
with our interpretive options rather than with the argument itself. I wish to argue that intuitions
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about the example are misleading because of a crucial disanalogy with the FTA.
Suppose you face a firing squad of 50 highly-trained sharpshooters. The order to fire is given,
you hear a loud bang, and you find yourself completely unharmed. One hypothetical explanation
is that the sharpshooters intended to miss. It is also possible that they did not intend to miss. Of
course, either way it is certain that they did miss and that you are alive. Nonetheless, it would be
absurd to think that, because it is maximally probable that you are alive (since you are here to
think about it) your being alive is not evidence that the sharpshooters intended to miss. Likewise,
it is absurd to think that, just because our background knowledge (assuming here that it includes
LR) makes it certain that FT is true, FT is not evidentially relevant to CR.
The difficulty is that there is a crucial disanalogy with the FTA that is obscured by a tendency
to trade on an ambiguity in formulating the example. Rejecting the evidential relevance of FT is
sometimes equated with believing that FT is “not in need of explanation” or that it is ”no surprise,”
since, were FT false, we should not be present to observe whether it is true or false. This is then
regarded as analogous to the view that the firing squad survivor should not seek an explanation of
his survival, or should not be surprised to observe his having survived.
But surprise and the need for explanation are not really at issue.8 Obviously, surviving the
firing squad is highly improbable in terms of physical probability, and prior to the event, given
one’s knowledge of firing squad’s, etc., one would have to attach a very low epistemic probability
to surviving the firing squad. After the event, it remains true that the event of survival had,
in those circumstances, a very low probability, and one might use such a probability in drawing
inferences about potential explanations of that event.9 In terms of epistemic probability, however,
the situation has now entirely changed. However surprised we might be from a psychological
standpoint, it would now be absurd to believe anything less than fully in one’s own survival, under
any hypothesis.
8Although in discussing this example, William Lane Craig describes epistemic probability as “a measure of the
degree to which we may rationally expect some proposition to be true” [5]. The use of “expect” as opposed to the
more standard and neutral “believe” simply encourages the confusion here described.
9Sober seems to reject even this possibility in his analysis of both the firing squad example and the fine-tuning
argument in terms of an “observer selection effect” Sober:2005a. Sober’s analysis has been criticized, however, by
Jonathan Weisberg [19]. My analysis involves no appeal to observer selection effects and thus bypasses difficulties in
figuring out how to take them into account.
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Here is where the disanalogy becomes crucial. As far as epistemic probabilities are concerned,
we never are in the position of the firing squad victim prior to the shooting. There is no viable
sense of epistemic probability in which we are justified in giving less than full probability to our
own existence at the time of our inquiry. Neither, as I argued above, can we justifiedly appeal to
physical probabilities of fine-tuning, as we can in the firing squad example both before and after
the shooting takes place. The firing squad example does not sufficiently resemble a probabilistic
FTA for us to draw conclusions from the analogy.
6 Conclusion
I do not claim to have shown that no FTA can succeed. What I have shown is that the burden lies
with advocates of probabilistic FTAs to articulate a conception of probability in terms of which a
probative FTA can be formulated while avoiding the problems canvassed here. Alternatively, they
might seek an argument that eschews probability entirely while remaining cogent. Whether such
an approach could work remains to be seen.
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